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449 
RATIONAL BASIS “PLUS” 
Thomas B. Nachbar* 
INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has asserted the power to review the 
substance of state and federal law for its reasonableness for 
almost 200 years.1 Since the mid-1960s, that review has taken the 
form of the “familiar ‘rational basis’ test,”2 under which the Court 
will strike a statute if it is not rationally related to a legitimate 
governmental interest.3 The test is hardly perfect. It lacks, for one 
thing any textual basis in the Constitution.4 It has been criticized 
from both ends, as alternatively a judicial usurpation of legislative 
power5 or “tantamount to no review at all.”6 But the Court has 
applied it for decades,7 and while the test is not universally loved, 
neither is it particularly controversial, at least as rules of 
constitutional law go. 
If rational basis scrutiny itself is largely uncontroversial, the 
same cannot be said for so-called “rational basis with bite,” 
“rational basis with teeth,” or—as I shall call it—“rational basis 
plus” review.8 Rational basis plus is, as Justice O’Connor 
 
 * Professor of Law, University of Virginia School of Law. I would like to thank 
Charles Barzun, Jill Hasday, Debbie Hellman, Greg Mitchell, David Strauss, and Geoff 
Stone for helpful comments and suggestions. I am also indebted to Jennifer Talbert for 
excellent research assistance. 
 1. See Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U.S. 627, 647 (1829); Thomas B. Nachbar, The 
Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 102 VA. L. REV. 1627 (2016). 
 2. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 461 (1980). 
 3. FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993). 
 4. See Hans A. Linde, Due Process of Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REV. 197, 222 (1976). 
 5. Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConnell, Due Process as Separation of 
Powers, 121 YALE L.J. 1672, 1801 (2012). 
 6. See, e.g., Beach Comm’ns, 508 U.S. at 323 n.3 (Stevens, J., concurring). Kenji 
Yoshino, The New Equal Protection, 124 HARV. L. REV. 747, 760 (2011) (describing 
rational basis review as a “free pass”). 
 7. See Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 132 S. Ct. 2073, 2080 (2012) (citing Lindsley 
v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911) for the rational basis test). 
 8. Among scholars, the preferred term appears to be “rational basis with bite,” 
garnering 501 hits in the Westlaw JLR database, well ahead of either “rational basis with 
teeth” with 98 hits and “rational basis plus” with only 76 (with some overlap among them). 
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describes it, a “more searching form of rational basis review.”9 
The Court has never acknowledged its existence, and Justice 
Scalia explicitly denied it.10 But lower courts11 and scholars12 have 
repeatedly identified it, noting a sub-set of cases in which the 
Court purported to apply rational basis scrutiny but in actuality 
applied something else—even Justice Scalia eventually relented, 
conceding the Court was applying a different form of review 
without explicitly elevating scrutiny above rational basis review.13 
Identifying instances of the rational basis plus test, what 
triggers it, and what it consists of has been the subject of much 
academic sport, increasingly so as the Court has applied the test 
to a series of cases touching on the hot-button issue of sexual 
orientation, including Romer v. Evans14 and United States v. 
Windsor.15 Such efforts have borne little fruit in the form of 
increased understanding. A doctrine that the Court does not 
acknowledge requires neither a justification nor an underlying 
theory, rendering inquiry into either the equivalent of a 
constitutional snipe hunt, and about as productive. 
We should be deeply suspicious of a doctrine the Court has 
not acknowledged applying, none more so than rational basis 
plus. Rational basis plus lends itself to obfuscation as practically 
no other doctrine can, in part because it purports to be an 
application of “rationality,” which is a nearly universally 
appealing concept.16 Close examination of the case that gave birth 
to the doctrine—United States Department of Agriculture v. 
 
None of the terms are popular with the Court, with zero hits for any of the three terms in 
the slightly more influential Westlaw SCT database. I prefer “rational basis plus,” both out 
of a general aversion to dental metaphors and because it avoids any potential confusion in 
rational basis cases actually involving teeth. See, e.g., Douglas v. Noble, 261 U.S. 165 (1923) 
(upholding state licensing restrictions on dentists against due process challenge). 
 9. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment). 
 10. Id. at 601 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 11. See, e.g., Mass. v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., 682 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 
2012). 
 12. Attention to rational basis plus started shortly after Moreno was decided, see 
Gary J. Simson, A Method for Analyzing Discriminatory Effects Under the Equal 
Protection Clause, 29 STAN. L. REV. 663, 675-77 (1977), and continues to this day, see 
Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel, Reconciling Rational Basis Review: When Does Rational 
Basis “Bite”?, 90 N.Y.U.L. REV. 2070 (2015).  
 13. United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2706 (2013) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 14. 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (citing Moreno). 
 15. 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2993 (2013) (citing Moreno). 
 16. Nachbar, supra note 1, at 1650–51. 
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Moreno17—shows how easily rational basis plus can be applied 
disingenuously. In deciding the case, Justice Brennan applied a 
standard of rationality far exceeding that demanded in an 
ordinary case. He was able to do so because, although rationality 
claims to be objective, a claim of irrationality is not objectively 
falsifiable. Study of the process by which Moreno and its 
companion case, United States Department of Agriculture v. 
Murry, were decided, demonstrates not only that rational basis 
plus can be used to import fundamental rights conceptions 
through the language of rationality, but also that Moreno itself 
was decided on exactly that basis. Far from an exercise in 
rationality, Brennan’s opinion in Moreno was an attempt to justify 
a result driven by approaches to fundamental rights that were, for 
one reason or another, unavailable to him as articulable bases for 
the decision. 
Recognizing both the impetus for rational basis plus and its 
unparalleled suitability to the to the task of justifying results 
driven by other approaches demonstrates just how truly 
exceptional and problematic the standard is. Lacking an 
articulated basis in principle, rational basis plus is impossible to 
either apply or constrain in a principled way. That is not to say 
that we should throw the rationality baby out with the bath water. 
 
 17. 413 U.S. 528 (1973). See, e.g., Yoshino, supra note 6, at 760 (citing Moreno for 
“rational basis with bite”); Russel K. Robinson, Unequal Protection, 68 STAN. L. REV. 151, 
165 (2016) (citing Moreno as the first of one of “three key cases” developing “heightened 
scrutiny” rational basis analysis); Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81 
FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 903 (“Moreno set the pattern for the one-two punch of animus 
analysis.”). Most importantly, this is the point that the Court itself has identified, see supra 
notes 14–15, even without admitting that rational basis plus exists. In situating rational 
basis plus on Moreno, I am excluding some earlier cases in categories that were ostensibly 
reviewed under rational basis but later employed standards of heightened scrutiny, such as 
in the case of sex. Cf. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). The Court having later announced 
a heightened scrutiny standard in such cases, it is reasonable to conclude that it was 
applying something more than the most permissive rational basis scrutiny in those earlier 
cases even if relying on the language of rationality. In his comprehensive survey of rational 
basis plus cases, Raphael Holoszyc-Pimentel identifies six cases applying rational basis plus 
before Moreno. Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 12, at 2106–10. One of those cases is Reed, 
which concerns sex discrimination, one was Eisenstadt v. Baird, which addressed access to 
contraceptives, one addressed illegitimacy (which like sex the Court later ruled was subject 
to intermediate scrutiny, see Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)), one upheld the 
statute under rational basis review but struck it as providing unequal access to courts, and 
two related to criminal procedure, an area not generally subject to rational basis review. 
See also Robert C. Farrell, Successful Rational Basis Cases in the Supreme Court from the 
1971 Term Through Romer v. Evans, 32 IND. L. REV. 357, 361–70 (1999) (collecting seven 
cases from the 1971 term evaluated by Gerald Gunther and explaining their relationship 
to later heighten scrutiny review). 
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Understanding how Moreno was decided both supplies a 
framework for understanding how this unspoken doctrine 
operates—by using rationality in an exclusive rather than an 
inclusive sense—and provides a guide for conducting rational 
basis scrutiny without the problematic aspects of rational basis 
“plus.” 
Acknowledging the dangers of rationality review also offers 
newfound justification for the Court’s oft-maligned “tiered” 
approach to scrutiny.18 Although frequently criticized, the tiered 
approach to scrutiny is valuable for providing exactly the kind of 
moral and legal accountability that rationality does not. While 
rationality purports to be objective, the tiers of scrutiny are 
themselves acknowledged to be contingent—no one thinks that 
nature or logic requires a particular form of scrutiny for any 
particular type of legislation. By forcing the Court to choose 
among the tiers of scrutiny, we force it to provide a justification 
for its choice—exactly the kind of justification it avoids by relying 
on rationality to strike statutes that it believes are problematic for 
other reasons. 
The paper proceeds by describing the issues at play in 
Moreno and Murry before delving into the process by which they 
were decided. Reference to the Justices’ internal 
communications, along with Justice Brennan’s notes, 
demonstrates a set of related concerns about the two cases. Justice 
Douglas was originally slated to author Moreno and Brennan 
took over only when Douglas’s chosen approach proved more 
than the rest of the Court would accept. But Brennan’s first 
approach to the case—to strike the statute on “morality” 
grounds—did not fit the case as argued, and only then did he turn 
to rationality as the basis of the decision. After discussing that 
shift in justification for Moreno itself, the paper considers the 
implications of Moreno, and process of its decision, for the Court’s 
rational basis “plus” jurisprudence. 
 
 18. E.g., Suzanne B. Goldberg, Equality Without Tiers, 77 S. CAL. L. REV. 481, 490 
(2004). 
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DECIDING MORENO 
JACINTA MORENO’S QUANDARY 
In 1964, Congress passed the Food Stamp Act as part of 
Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society Program.19 Congress laid out the 
Act’s purposes in the act itself, connecting social welfare with 
agricultural policy to “safeguard the health and well-being of the 
Nation’s population and raise levels of nutrition among low-
income households . . . promote the distribution in a beneficial 
manner of our agricultural abundances and [] strengthen our 
agricultural economy, as well as result in more orderly marketing 
and distribution of food.”20 
In 1971, Congress amended the Food Stamp Act to restrict 
food stamp benefits by redefining an eligible “household” as one 
in which all the residents were related.21 Several food stamp 
recipients who would be denied benefits under the new definition 
sued, including Jacinta Moreno, a 56-year diabetic requiring 
special food and medical care who lived with Ermina Sanchez, 
who was, even without caring for Ms. Moreno, poor enough to 
qualify for both public assistance and food stamps for her and her 
three children. Under the change, both Moreno and Sanchez (and 
Sanchez’s children) would be denied assistance because Moreno 
was unrelated to Sanchez but living in Sanchez’s home.22 
MORENO’S RATIONALITY 
The Court, following the three-judge district court, rejected 
any rational relationship to the stated congressional ends, since 
familial status is irrelevant to both one’s own nutritional needs 
and one’s ability to stimulate the agricultural economy in 
satisfying them—the two statutory purposes.23 At first blush, this 
seems unexceptional; people almost certainly eat (and likely buy) 
the same amount of food whether they’re related to their 
roommates or not. That approach does raise the question of 
whether each provision of a statute must individually further the 
 
 19. MATTHEW GRITTER AND IAIN MACROBERT, THE POLICY AND POLITICS OF 
FOOD STAMPS AND SNAP (2015). 
 20. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 533 (quoting 7 U.S.C. § 2011).  
 21. Id. at 530 (citing 84 Stat. 2048, § 3(e)). 
 22. Id. at 531–32. 
 23. Id. at 534 (quoting Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313 (D.D.C. 
1972)). 
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entire program’s stated end. As the government argued, welfare 
programs necessarily entail choices among priorities, 
necessitating some exclusion.24 Any provision limiting the scope 
of the food stamp program would not directly further either of the 
stated legislative ends; it would do so only indirectly by making 
possible the parts of the food stamp program that do.25 
Rational basis scrutiny doesn’t require a rational relationship 
to the legislative end, though—it requires a relationship to any 
conceivable end, and so the government offered two ends in its 
brief, both related to the prevention of abuse of the program: 
First, the government argued that Congress could rationally 
conclude that the program was more likely to be subject to moral 
hazard by non-related cohabitants who chose to “remain 
voluntarily poor” while living off of food stamps, citing the 
example mentioned in the legislative history of college fraternities 
or “other collections of essentially unrelated individuals who 
voluntarily chose to cohabit and live off food stamps.”26 Similarly, 
households of non-related individuals, the government argued, 
were more likely to have financial support from outside the 
household, rendering them not really “poor at all.”27 (College 
students again come to mind, although the government didn’t 
argue that.) Second, the government argued that Congress could 
have concluded that households with unrelated persons in them 
are “[more] fluid living arrangements having little stability over 
time.”28 Such households present challenges to the administration 
of the food stamp program, since the information the Department 
of Agriculture required to determine eligibility would be harder 
to obtain and maintain. It was rational, the government argued, 
that Congress could respond to the increased cost of “eligibility 
 
 24. Brief for Appellant at 13-14, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) 
(No. 72-534). 
 25. See Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1961, 116 Cong. Rec. 42021 
(statement of Rep. Belcher) (“If you really want to kill the food stamp program, just jack 
it up so high that the taxpayers will completely revolt. Keep all of these gadgets in the bill, 
keep the students, the hippies, the strikers, and everybody else, enabling all of them to get 
on the food stamp plan, and it will not take very long for those people who want to kill the 
food stamp plan to get the job done.”). 
 26. Brief for Appellant at 15 (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8, 116 Cong. 
Rec. 42003) (statement of Cong. Foley). 
 27. Id. at 16. 
 28. Id. at 16. 
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surveillance” by choosing not to make such households 
beneficiaries of the program.29 
Justice Brennan’s majority opinion rejected the rationality of 
the government’s abuse-based justifications by demonstrating 
that, because fraud was still possible after the changes,30 “the 
classification here in issue is not only ‘imprecise,’ it is wholly 
without any rational basis,”31 without explaining at what point 
imprecision crossed into the realm of the irrational. (The Court 
did not address the distinct moral hazard argument at all.) 
Instead, the Court identified another purpose in the legislative 
history: a statement of intent to prevent “hippies” or “hippie 
communes” from receiving food stamps,32 which the District 
Court had cited33 and the plaintiffs had identified as the “true 
purpose of the unrelated household provision.”34 Having 
disqualified the stated congressional and proffered purposes, the 
Court identified animosity to hippies as the sole purpose and 
invalidated the provision as based on “a bare congressional desire 
to harm a politically unpopular group,” which “cannot constitute 
a legitimate governmental interest.”35 Justice Rehnquist 
dissented. Not reaching the question of hippies (much less their 
communes), Justice Rehnquist accepted the imperfection of the 
statutory classification, but saw in it an attempt to limit food 
stamps to households that had not been formed for the purpose 
of receiving them, a purpose rationally served by the statute. 
Clearly some such households were excluded, which to Justice 
Rehnquist satisfied the standard even though it also excluded 
some deserving households and failed to exclude some 
undeserving ones.36 
On this, Rehnquist seems to have had the better argument. 
Every legislative distinction necessarily fails at the margin, and so 
 
 29. Id. at 17. 
 30. See U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 538 (1973). 
 31. Id. at 538. 
 32. Id. at 534 (“The legislative history that does exist, however, indicates that that 
amendment was intended to prevent so called ‘hippies’ and ‘hippie communes’ from 
participating in the food stamp program.”) (quoting H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 91-1793, p. 8; 116 
Cong. Rec. 44439 (1970) (statement of Sen. Holland)). But see id. at 543 (Douglas, J., 
concurring) (citing “hippy communes” rather than “hippie communes”). 
 33. Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 313–14 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 34. Brief for Appellee at 17, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528 (1973) (No. 
72-534). 
 35. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. 
 36. Id. at 546 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
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demonstrating that a statute can be over- or under-inclusive does 
little to demonstrate its constitutional irrationality. Justices 
Brennan and Rehnquist seem to have been talking past each 
other, but the Court has engaged in exactly this debate elsewhere. 
In New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, the Transit 
Authority had adopted a policy against employing narcotics users. 
That might seem sensible for an organization that operates public 
buses and trains, but the ban included users of methadone, which 
is frequently prescribed to those recovering from heroin addiction 
and does not hinder one’s ability to work when taken orally.37 The 
Transit Authority nevertheless banned methadone users because 
of the likelihood of a potential relapse into heroin or other illegal 
drug use. Some methadone users are likely to relapse into using 
heroin or other illegal drugs, but many do not, which made the 
ban as applicable to all methadone users overbroad.38 Granting 
that the safe and efficient operation of the transit system was a 
legitimate end, the Court concluded that, while the coverage of 
the methadone was an imperfect way to exclude those who might 
use illegal drugs, there was a causal connection between 
methadone use and unemployability, rendering the methadone 
ban rational.39 
Justice White dissented, pointing out the many ways that the 
distinction banning all methadone users (as opposed to only those 
who had been in treatment for a short time) was necessarily 
arbitrary, especially at the margins.40 The majority essentially 
conceded that point but found it inapposite, since every distinction 
becomes increasingly arbitrary at the margins.41 In policymaking, 
there are few “bright lines,” especially so when a behavior is being 
regulated not for its own sake but because it increases the risk of 
another bad outcome.42 If ineffectiveness at the margins were 
enough to establish constitutional irrationality, no legislation 
could survive rational basis review. 
 
 37. New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 571–73 (1979). 
 38. Id. at 592. 
 39. Id. at 592 (“As the District Court recognized, the special classification created by 
TA’s rule serves the general objectives of safety and efficiency.”). 
 40. Id. at 606–07 (White, J., dissenting) 
 41. Id. at 591. 
 42. See id. (“[T]he uncertainties associated with the rehabilitation of heroin addicts 
preclude [the District Court] from identifying any bright line marking the point at which 
the risk of regression ends. By contrast, the ‘no drugs’ policy now enforced by TA is 
supported by the legitimate inference that as long as a treatment program (or other drug 
use) continues, a degree of uncertainty persists.”). 
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The standard applied in Moreno departed from nominal 
rational basis scrutiny not only by requiring a relationship 
between means and ends that was more exacting than mere 
rationality but also by rejecting an alternative proffered legitimate 
end in favor of crediting only the illegitimate end the plaintiffs had 
advanced. Alternative justifications are a staple of rational basis 
cases, and nominal rational basis scrutiny requires that they be 
handled in favor of upholding legislation. 
Beazer again is instructive. To his concerns about the 
rationality of the statute, Justice White added another: that the 
actual motivation for the ban was not the safety and efficiency of 
the transit system but rather an invidious one to discriminate 
against the kinds of people also likely to be drug users: 
Heroin addiction is a special problem of the poor, and the 
addict population is composed largely of racial minorities that 
the Court has previously recognized as politically powerless 
and historical subjects of majoritarian neglect. . . . On the other 
hand, the afflictions to which petitioners are more sympathetic, 
such as alcoholism and mental illness, are shared by both white 
and black, rich and poor.43 
If Justice White truly thought the statute was motivated by 
an illegitimate end, such as discrimination against methadone 
users as a proxy for racial discrimination, why did he bother 
considering whether the statute actually served its avowed 
purposes of safety and efficiency? After all, purposeful racial 
discrimination is an equal protection violation in its own right.44 
The answer lies in the structure of rational basis review, which 
requires the Court to uphold a statute that rationally serves a 
legitimate government interest, even one the legislature did not 
consider.45 
 
 43. Id. at 609, n.15 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted). 
 44. See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“The central purpose of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is the prevention of official 
conduct discriminating on the basis of race.”). See also Kim Forde-Mazrui, Traditional 
Justification: The Case of Opposite-Sex Marriage, 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 281, 308 (2011) 
(Regulation “must not be tainted by illegitimate purposes, beliefs, or assumptions. An 
interest is tainted when the reasoning or motivation leading a state to pursue an ostensibly 
legitimate interest includes an illegitimate assumption or belief, such as an irrational fear 
or impermissible stereotype.”). 
 45. FCC v. Beach Comm’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–14 (1993); Yoshino, supra note 
6, at 760 (“In other words, even if the legislature had provided no rationale or an 
inadequate rationale, the state action would be upheld so long as the Court could supply 
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The analysis in Moreno is exceptional even as compared to 
Justice Brennan’s own rational basis jurisprudence. Eight years 
later, Justice Brennan would write an opinion in Minnesota v. 
Clover Leaf Creamery, in which the Court upheld against both an 
equal protection and dormant Commerce Clause challenge a 
Minnesota statute prohibiting the sale of milk in plastic cartons 
despite evidence in the legislative history that the ban was 
protectionist46 because there was also evidence to support other, 
permissible ends. Given a plausible explanation, “it is not the 
function of the courts to substitute their evaluation of legislative 
facts for that of the legislature.”47 
Thus was born rational basis plus, which on the surface looks 
to be a more exacting form of rational basis scrutiny. On this 
reading, the Court was simply drawn to an impermissible end by 
the plaintiffs, and having gotten a whiff of that impermissible end, 
the Court used the means-ends structure of rational basis review 
to exclude alternative ends by demonstrating the lack of a 
(rational) connection between the means chosen and those other 
ends. After what was essentially a process of elimination, only a 
single, illegitimate end remained, and the Court’s holding that 
animosity to hippies is an illegitimate end is firmly entrenched in 
equal protection and due process review.48 
Of course, the doctrine would have been much clearer if the 
Court had actually held that, should it find an illegitimate end in 
the legislative history, it would credit that end over legitimate 
ones. That approach appears to be what the plaintiffs were 
arguing for, would have resembled the Court’s approach to 
determining legislative intent in cases calling for heightened 
scrutiny,49 and would fit the means-ends structure of rational basis 
 
one. Because judges could imagine many things, ordinary rational basis review was 
tantamount to a free pass for legislation.”). 
 46. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471, n.7 (1980) (dismissing 
the protectionist statements in the legislative history as an “economic defense of an Act 
genuinely proposed for environmental reasons”). 
 47. Id. at 470. As Justice Brennan himself wrote several years before Moreno, if 
anything, dormant Commerce Clause analysis suggested a more demanding standard than 
mere rational basis. See Fl. Lime and Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 154 
(1963) (“Other state regulations raising similar problems have been found to be 
discriminatory or burdensome notwithstanding a legitimate state interest.”). 
 48. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 534. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2963 
(2013) (citing Moreno); Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996) (citing Moreno). 
 49. Vill. of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Dev’t Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 
(1977). 
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review while requiring a closer relationship than rationality—
truly Justice O’Connor’s “more searching form of rational basis 
review.” The Court did not acknowledge it was changing the 
standard of review in Moreno, though, and so we are left to 
wonder exactly what form of review the Court thought it was 
conducting in Moreno. 
THE PATH TO MORENO 
Moreno was argued the same day as a companion case, 
United States Department of Agriculture v. Murry.50 Brought by 
the same attorneys as Moreno, Murry was a constitutional attack 
on another part of the 1971 amendments to the Food Stamp Act, 
one to § 5(b) of the Food Stamp Act making an entire household 
ineligible if any adult member of the household was claimed as a 
dependent for federal income tax purposes by a member of an 
ineligible household.51 As in Moreno, a three-judge panel had 
found § 5(b) unconstitutional and the government appealed. 
At the consolidated conference following oral argument, six 
Justices voted to affirm in Moreno and five in Murry (with two 
voting to vacate and remand for further findings).52 Justice 
Douglas, the senior Justice in both majorities, assigned both cases 
to himself and started circulating drafts of the combined 
decision.53 
Justice Douglas’s approach in his draft Moreno majority 
opinions is well-reflected in what eventually became his 
concurrence in the case. In his draft, Justice Douglas conceded the 
general rationality between the unrelated-persons provisions and 
the stated legislative purpose of the act, but “as applied here” (in 
the case of Moreno herself and others like her) it was “wholly 
unrelated to the Food Stamp Program’s purposes.”54 In so doing, 
Justice Douglas shifted from examining the general rationality of 
the provision to its accuracy as to every individual—to be no 
broader than necessary to serve the government’s end. What 
 
 50. 413 U.S. 508 (1973). 
 51. See id. at 515 (citing 84 Stat. 2049 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014(b))). 
 52. Opinions of William J. Brennan, Jr., Notes 70 (October Term, 1972) (on file with 
the Library of Congress) (William J. Brennan Papers, box II:6, folder 16) [hereinafter 
Brennan Notes]. 
 53. Id. at 71. 
 54. Draft Opinion dated May 3, 1973, at 4, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, No. 72-
534 (on file with the Library of Congress) (William J. Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder 
10) [hereinafter Douglas First Draft].  
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prompted Justice Douglas to apply so exacting a standard was the 
connection to a fundamental right: Although Dandridge v. 
Williams55 had held three years earlier (over dissents by both 
Douglas and Justice Brennan) that welfare assistance was subject 
to nominal rational basis scrutiny, Justice Douglas saw the 
“unrelated persons” provision as implicating “associational rights 
that lie in the penumbra of the First Amendment,”56 requiring that 
the act be “narrowly drawn” to serve its fraud justification57 or, as 
he wrote elsewhere, a “compelling governmental interest.”58 
Justice Douglas described this as “the closest scrutiny.”59 Douglas 
translated this form of scrutiny into the language of presumptions, 
following Stanley v. Illinois,60 decided earlier that term, and 
planned to strike the provision in Murry as establishing an 
irrebuttable presumption that the household was not needy based 
on a tax filing decision made by someone outside the household 
in a previous year—a violation of procedural due process.61 
BRENNAN’S FIRST ATTEMPT: A NOVEL  
APPROACH TO AVOIDANCE 
Justice Brennan was skeptical of Douglas’s approach in both 
cases and wrote Douglas to express his concern that Douglas’s 
approach would garner a majority in neither case. 
For his own part, Brennan would have applied strict scrutiny, 
ostensibly to Murry but apparently to Moreno as well, “because 
the challenged provision involves welfare.”62 His preferred 
approach being foreclosed by Dandridge, Brennan suggested that 
Douglas apply rational basis scrutiny to the provision in Murry, 
arguing that the connection between tax dependency and 
indigence was entirely irrational, since the existence of tax 
dependency did not establish the amount of the support 
received—an individual could logically be both a tax dependent 
 
 55. 397 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1970). 
 56. Douglas First Draft, supra note 54, at 7.  
 57. Id. (quoting Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307 (1940)). 
 58. Id., supra note 54, at 8 (quoting Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969)); 
U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. at 544 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring).  
 59. Douglas First Draft, supra note 54, at 8; Moreno, 413 U.S. at 545 (Douglas, J., 
concurring). 
 60. 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). 
 61. See Douglas First Draft, supra note 54, at 12. 
 62. Memorandum from Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas 2 (May 11, 1973) (on file 
with the Library of Congress) (William J. Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder 10) 
[hereinafter Brennan-Douglas Memo]. 
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and indigent, a situation “sufficiently common that the statute 
cannot be said to have a rational basis.”63 Brennan didn’t specify 
what frequency of incidence would qualify as “sufficiently 
common.” As it happens, Douglas did not follow Brennan’s 
advice and stuck with the presumptions approach in Murry, albeit 
in watered down form, highlighting the possibility for erroneous 
applications (for instance, that the tax dependency determination 
was made a year prior to the food stamp eligibility determination) 
and weakly claiming at the end of the opinion that the distinction 
“rests on an irrebuttable presumption often contrary to fact. It 
therefore lacks critical ingredients of due process.”64 
Brennan had a different solution for the problems he saw in 
Moreno, although it wasn’t rational basis or anything like it. 
Brennan had noticed that Circuit Judge McGowan, writing for the 
three-judge court below, had struck the statute because the 
government had offered a “morality” justification.65 McGowan, 
after dispensing with the declared statutory ends as not rationally 
related to the unrelated persons restriction, found himself with 
only one possible end advanced by the government: the “fostering 
of morality.”66 
Rather than declare the morality justification illegitimate, 
McGowan actually reasoned backward from the morality 
justification to the conclusion that it could not be attributed to 
Congress. Because the statute regulated domestic relationships, a 
morality justification would raise “serious constitutional 
questions” as implicating both “the rights to privacy . . . in the 
home” (citing the Court’s then-budding fundamental rights 
jurisprudence: Griswold v. Connecticut, Stanley v. Georgia, and 
Eisenstadt v. Baird)67 and implicating “First Amendment 
freedoms.”68 Avoiding conflict between statutes and the 
Constitution has a venerable history,69 suggesting Judge 
McGowan’s avoidance intuition was well-placed. But in an odd 
feat of constitutional avoidance gymnastics, Judge McGowan had 
refused to attribute to Congress an intent that would trigger 
 
 63. Id.  
 64. U.S. Dept. of Agric. v. Murry, 413 U.S. 508, 513–14 (1973). 
 65. Brennan-Douglas Memo, supra note 62, at 2.  
 66. Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 67. Id. (emphasis in original). 
 68. Id.  
 69. See Adrian Vermeule, Saving Constructions, 15 GEO. L.J. 1945, 1948–50 (1997) 
(tracing the history of the canon of constitutional avoidance). 
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heightened constitutional scrutiny even though the court’s refusal 
to do so would require it to strike the statute. In short, the court 
concluded it would be better to attribute no end to the statute 
than attribute an end that might require heightened scrutiny, 
essentially killing the patient to cure the disease or, more 
accurately, killing the patient to avoid conducting a test that might 
reveal a disease.70 To Judge McGowan’s association-in-the-home 
argument, Justice Brennan proposed applying the same 
heightened-scrutiny-implies-non-attribution-to-Congress 
approach to the lack of a close fit in the statute, since it “was not 
narrowly drawn to serve this purpose”71 of furthering morality. 
Brennan admitted the non-attribution approach “rests somewhat 
on a fiction,” but he felt it was of a piece with the approach he’d 
taken in Eisenstadt v. Baird (in which Brennan’s opinion for the 
Court had excluded a number of proffered statutory ends for 
restricting access to birth control72) and, more importantly, could 
“attract a Court.”73 With these arguments (and after Douglas 
attempted another draft74), Brennan convinced Douglas to give 
him the Moreno opinion.75 
BACKING IN TO RATIONAL BASIS “PLUS” 
Given how intricate a device he’d constructed to convert the 
government’s morality justification into an liability, one can 
imagine Justice Brennan’s dismay when he discovered76 that the 
government had dropped the morality justification for the 
 
 70. Judge McGowan explained that the court’s refusal to attribute the “morality” 
end to Congress would not change the outcome, because if the court did so, the statute 
could not survive the resulting scrutiny. In a portion of the case more closely reflecting the 
mores of the time than even Judge McGowan understood, he explained that in order to 
save the statute under those circumstances, it would be necessary to read into the statute 
a classification limiting the provision to households “of both sexes as distinct from all other 
households,” apparently in the belief that only households containing members of both 
sexes could embody the types of living arrangements that would need to be discouraged in 
order to foster morality. See Moreno, 345 F. Supp. at 315. 
 71. Brennan-Douglas Memo, supra note 62, at 2. 
 72. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 447–52 (1972). 
 73. Brennan-Douglas Memo, supra note 62, at 2. 
 74. Draft Opinion dated May 3, 1973, at 4, U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, No. 72-
534 (on file with the Library of Congress) (William J. Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder 
10); 73; Memo from Justice Brennan to Justice Douglas (May 17, 1973) (William J. 
Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder 10). 
 75. Brennan Notes, supra note 52, at 73; Memorandum from Justice Douglas to the 
Chief Justice (May 17, 1973) (William J. Brennan Papers, box I:302, folder 10). 
 76. Brennan Notes, supra note 52, at 73 (“To my dismay I discovered . . . .”). 
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unrelated persons provision in the Supreme Court.77 The change 
was of no consequence to Brennan, who quickly shifted to what 
he considered to be an easy rational basis rationale: 
As it turned out, however, [the anti-abuse justification] 
contention was even less convincing than the “morality” 
argument. Indeed, in practical operation, the statute was not in 
any sense rationally designed to serve this goal. The opinion 
was written along these lines and circulated to the conference, 
with a good deal of confidence.78 
Justice Brennan’s conclusion that the unrelated persons 
provision was so clearly a violation of the rationality requirement 
is in tension with the scholarly consensus that Moreno actually 
applied something more strict than rational basis review, 
suggesting that Brennan’s confidence in his analysis was 
somewhat misplaced, even if it did manage to “attract a Court.” 
Moreno started out (or re-booted) as a case that might have 
launched a completely new approach to inferring congressional 
intent (don’t if doing so raises constitutional concerns) based on 
a novel theory of fundamental rights (that providing welfare 
benefits based on familial status implicates a fundamental right). 
The one thing Brennan did not originally plan to do was apply the 
rational basis test, in either vanilla or “plus” form,79 although 
rational basis plus scrutiny proved itself more than able to the task 
of invalidating a statute that he first intended to dispose of on 
fundamental-rights grounds. 
THE CONSEQUENCES OF MORENO 
One could write off Moreno as simply an over-enthusiastic 
but incorrect application of the rational basis test but for the 
impact the case has had; indeed, Moreno has had more impact as 
an assertion of judicial authority than insistence on the rational 
basis test itself. In the years since Moreno was decided, many cases 
(including several on the cutting edge of constitutional law) have 
invalidated provisions as unconstitutional applying Moreno’s 
standard,80 while the Court has used nominal rational basis 
 
 77. Id. See also U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 535, n.7 (1973). 
 78. Brennan Notes, supra note 52, at 73. 
 79. Nor, for that matter, did Brennan plan to base the case on what has become the 
most durable part of the case actually acknowledged by the Court as a rule: that a bare 
desire to harm group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest. 
 80. See generally Holoszyc-Pimentel, supra note 12 (collecting cases).  
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scrutiny to strike a statute only once.81 Moreno has launched its 
own line of cases clearly applying something other than mere 
rational basis review.82 But it is a mistake to view Moreno as 
simply inaugurating a heightened form of rational basis review; 
even in the earliest stages of its decision, Moreno was premised 
not on rational basis review but on a set of far-reaching 
propositions of both judicial review and substantive constitutional 
law. 
MORENO AS A FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS CASE 
As Justice Brennan’s notes and his memo to Justice Douglas 
show, Justice Brennan’s opinion in Moreno was rooted in 
something quite different from a somewhat more rigorous form 
of rational basis review. Rather, Justice Brennan’s approach to 
Moreno was driven by two distinct theories, both of them soundly 
rejected by the Court: The first was an inclination to apply strict 
scrutiny to welfare legislation, which was rejected outright in 
Dandridge. The second was similarly rejected in Dandridge, albeit 
in a different way. 
Given Dandridge, Brennan had to accept that food stamp 
benefits themselves were not subject to heightened scrutiny, but 
Judge McGowan’s interpretive strategy was itself predicated on 
the impact of the food-stamp decision on a fundamental right: that 
of privacy in the home. This was the fundamental right that 
prompted Judge McGowan to refuse to follow the normal 
approach in rational basis cases—to rely on any conceivable 
legislative end that might uphold the provision in question. By 
following Judge McGowan, Justice Brennan would similarly have 
imported the Court’s fundamental-right-of-privacy doctrine into 
 
 81. The case is Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County Comm’n of Webster 
County, 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989). In Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal, the state had limited itself 
(in the state constitution) to assessing land based on its present value. The Court found 
that the local taxing authority had impermissibly assessed some land based on its current 
value while assessing some on historical value. One could arguably characterize Murry 
itself as a second rational-basis case, although the Court has largely treated it as addressing 
the use of irrebuttable presumptions. See, e.g., Levine v. Milne, 424 U.S. 577, 584 n.9 (1976) 
(“Since nothing is conclusively presumed against the applicant, who is clearly required to 
prove his eligibility if he is to receive relief, this Court’s prior cases dealing with so-called 
irrebuttable presumptions [including Murry] are not in point.”). See generally Nachbar, 
supra note 1.  
 82. Farrell, supra note 17, at 358 (Rational basis plus creates “two sets of rationality 
cases, one deferential and one heightened, operating as if in parallel universes with no 
connection between them.”). 
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the welfare arena, substantially limiting the reach of Dandridge 
by shifting the focus away from the government’s welfare decision 
(which was subject to rational basis) and toward the individual’s 
conduct that triggered the different treatment (which implicated 
fundamental rights because it took place in the home). 
Indeed, when one looks at the reasoning that Justice Brennan 
had originally planned to base Moreno upon, the differences 
between Justice Brennan’s thinking and Douglas’s seem to be 
more in degree than kind. Both Justices thought the statute to be 
problematic because of its impact on a fundamental right. Justice 
Douglas thought the rights were “associational rights that lie in 
the penumbra of the First Amendment,”83 and although Brennan 
had objected to Douglas’s reliance on the First Amendment, 
Judge McGowan had, in addition to the right of privacy, relied on 
First Amendment rights as the basis for insisting on a closer 
relationship in the statute before attributing that end to 
Congress.84 Thus, while the tool was one of statutory 
interpretation rather than judicial review, the fundamental-rights 
structure itself remained, Dandridge notwithstanding. The major 
advantage of Judge McGowan’s approach, though, was not that it 
relied on a more well-established set of rights but that it avoided 
debate over fundamental rights at all by refusing to attribute the 
(constitutionally problematic) end to Congress and thereby 
avoiding a test of either the legitimacy of the “morality” end itself 
or the relationship necessary to uphold a statute intended to serve 
an end that raised “serious constitutional questions.”85 
Viewing welfare conditions as regulation of private relations, 
as Judge McGowan had done and Justice Brennan proposed to 
do, would have subjected a variety of welfare regulations to 
heightened scrutiny. Although lacking the color of the occasional 
reference to hippies, the debate over the 1970 Food Stamp Act 
amendments was dominated not by the unrelated-persons or tax-
dependency provisions (neither of which appear to have been 
remotely controversial) but rather by an amendment requiring all 
able-bodied adult members of a household to be willing to accept 
work lest the entire household lose food stamp benefits.86 When 
viewed as a regulation of the private right of familial association, 
 
 83. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 544 (1973). 
 84. Moreno v. U.S. Dep’t. of Agric., 345 F. Supp. 310, 314 (D.D.C. 1972). 
 85. Id.  
 86. Food Stamp Amendments Act §4, 84 Stat. 2050 (amending 7 U.S.C. § 2014(c)). 
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the work requirement could have been seen as forcing a choice 
for parents between work or abandoning their children (a point 
that Senator McGovern made in the debates over the food stamp 
amendments act87), potentially implicating the very same 
associational and family rights that both Justices Brennan and 
Douglas had viewed as being at issue in Moreno. The 
“fundamental rights equal protection”88 doctrine exemplified by 
Shapiro v. Thompson89 that the Court rejected in Dandridge had 
relied on exactly this connection between welfare and 
fundamental rights: to describe the limitation of nominal right to 
welfare payments against a fundamental right (in Shapiro, the 
right to travel among the States) and rely on the impact on the 
fundamental right to trigger heightened scrutiny.90 Justice 
Brennan (and Justice Douglas) viewed the unrelated persons 
provision as a limitation not on the nominal right to food stamps 
but on the fundamental right of association. Justice Douglas had 
taken the same approach in his Dandridge dissent. The parallels 
between Brennan’s original approach in Moreno and Douglas’s 
Dandridge dissent are even closer when one considers that Justice 
Douglas’s Dandridge dissent was grounded not on constitutional, 
equal protection grounds, but on statutory interpretation. The 
restriction at issue in Dandridge was Maryland’s imposition of an 
absolute cap on benefits regardless of family size in implementing 
a federal welfare program.91 Justice Douglas had (as had Justice 
Marshall in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan) argued in 
Dandridge that Maryland’s restriction was invalid under the 
federal welfare statute because the incentive it provided to “break 
up large families” failed to further the congressional purpose of 
the act,92 much as Justice Brennan would have questioned 
 
 87. See Amendments to the Food Stamp Act of 1961, 116 Cong. Rec. 44436 
(statement of Sen. McGovern). 
 88. See Michael J. Klarman, An Interpretive Theory of Modern Equal Protection, 90 
MICH. L. REV. 213 (1991). 
 89. 394 U.S. 618 (1969). 
 90. Id. at 634 (“The waiting-period provision denies welfare benefits to otherwise 
eligible applicants solely because they have recently moved into the jurisdiction. But in 
moving from State to State or to the District of Columbia appellees were exercising a 
constitutional right, and any classification which serves to penalize the exercise of that 
right, unless shown to be necessary to promote a compelling governmental interest, is 
unconstitutional.”). 
 91. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473 (1970). 
 92. Id. at 502 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“The District Court correctly states that this 
incentive to break up family units created by the maximum grant regulation is in conflict 
with a fundamental purpose of the Act.”); id. at 513–14 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
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whether Congress had intended to regulate morality with the food 
stamp program. Although couched in terms of statutory 
interpretation, the implications of Justice Brennan’s original 
approach were both constitutional and far-reaching, even more so 
than Justice Douglas’s dissent in Dandridge because of the 
constitutional justification for the narrow construction Judge 
McGowan and Justice Brennan would give the statute. 
In this way, Justice Brennan’s original plan for Moreno could 
have resulted in a ground-breaking shift in constitutional law, 
essentially resurrecting the heightened scrutiny of the 
fundamental rights equal protection line of cases through a new 
version of the well-accepted avoidance canon of statutory 
interpretation. On the other hand, it’s possible that Justice 
Brennan would have been no more successful than he anticipated 
Justice Douglas was going to be. The fiction, and its connection to 
fundamental rights, would have been obvious to all. Eisenstadt v. 
Baird—the model for Brennan’s approach to Moreno—was 
decided by a seven-Justice court, with Rehnquist (who dissented 
in Moreno) and Justice Powell not participating.93 Justice 
Brennan’s majority in Eisenstadt attracted only four votes 
(including his own), with a strong dissent from Chief Justice 
Burger,94 and a concurrence by Justice White joined by Justice 
Blackmun to distinguish the statute from economic legislation.95 
It is doubtful Brennan would have received any of these votes to 
extend the Eisenstadt approach to what was clearly an economic 
regulation in Moreno. (Indeed, Blackmun had originally voted to 
overturn the district court in Moreno.96) We will never know what 
would have happened had Brennan pursued his fundamental-
rights approach to the avoidance canon simply because the 
government failed to make the morality argument in the Supreme 
Court. 
WHAT MORENO’S DECISION TEACHES  
ABOUT RATIONAL BASIS PLUS 
Although the realized Moreno did not live up to Brennan’s 
idealized version, there are several lessons to be taken from the 
way in which it was decided. 
 
 93. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 455 (1972). 
 94. Id. at 465 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 95. Id. at 460–61 (White, J., concurring in the result). 
 96. Brennan Notes, supra note 52, at 70–71. 
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First, the process of deciding Moreno demonstrates the shaky 
intellectual ground on which rational basis plus scrutiny stands. 
Both Brennan’s notes and his memo to Justice Douglas suggest 
that Brennan had decided for reasons unrelated to rational basis 
scrutiny that the statute should be struck and landed on rational 
basis as the means to do so only when his preferred reasoning was 
no longer supported by the facts (or rather, by the government’s 
justification). One might object to that claim by arguing that it is 
equally likely that Brennan independently thought that the 
statute failed the deferential form of the rational basis test, but 
virtually no one has read Moreno as embodying the deferential 
form of the rational basis test in the decades since its decision. The 
credibility of a claim that Brennan simply shifted from one basis 
of his decision to another equally applicable one depends on his 
fidelity to the rational basis test. Moreno’s status as the standard 
for rational basis plus scrutiny combined with Brennan’s original 
attempt to apply a much stricter form of review undermines any 
claim that Brennan was also convinced that the provision failed 
the deferential form of rational basis review.97 Brennan’s shift to 
the rational-basis justification in Moreno was at best an 
obfuscation of his real basis for striking the statute and at worst a 
disingenuous ploy to re-purpose rational basis scrutiny to avoid a 
fight over fundamental rights98 while following a fundamental-
rights approach to resolving the case: either his view that welfare 
regulation should be subject to strict scrutiny or his view, shared 
in slightly different form by Justice Douglas, that residential 
associational rights are so fundamental as to affect the standard 
of review applicable to economic or social legislation touching on 
the home (or both). 
Second, identifying the connection between Justice 
Brennan’s eventual Moreno opinion and its methodological 
origins in Judge McGowan’s opinion below demonstrates the 
 
 97. Cf. Shelby Cty. v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013), in which the Court avoided 
confronting the question of whether legislation passed pursuant to Section 2 of the 
Fifteenth Amendment is subject to the same, heightened, congruence and proportionality 
test applied to legislation passed pursuant to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment by 
showing that the statute did not satisfy what it purported to be rational basis scrutiny. 
 98. Such a move was lost on no one, except perhaps the Court itself. Gerald Gunther 
pointed out a similar use of means-ends scrutiny in Reed, Eisenstadt, and Griswold the 
Term before Moreno was decided. See Gerald Gunther, Foreword: In Search of Evolving 
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARV. L. REV. 
1, 30 (1972) (“The resort to means-oriented scrutiny in all these cases is at least partly 
attributable to its attractiveness as an avoidance device.”). 
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ways in which the Moreno approach is not really rational basis 
“plus” at all but an altogether different form of scrutiny. In a 
typical rational basis case, the Court will use rationality 
inclusively—to identify potential ends in hope of finding one that 
supports the statute. In Moreno, Justice Brennan used rationality 
exclusively—to reject the government’s proffered ends, 
eventually landing on one that the Court considered illegitimate. 
The distinction between inclusive and exclusive rationality is 
presented by the different approaches to ends taken by the 
majority and dissent in Beazer. Justice White had no direct 
evidence of an illegitimate motive, and so in order to land upon 
the one he eventually found, rational basis scrutiny required him 
to exclude all the other (legitimate) ends potentially served by the 
policy, which he did by showing that the policy did not rationally 
serve those alternative ends. Thus, Justice White employed 
rationality in a different but related way to that of the majority. 
The majority used rationality to demonstrate a causal connection 
between the provision and a legitimate governmental interest—to 
include legitimate ends as within the ambit of the provision. 
Justice White used rationality to exclude potential ends, 
eventually finding only an illegitimate one remaining. 
It is tempting to allow evidence of illegitimate ends to alter 
the rationality inquiry, but the two are distinct. Beazer presents a 
more pristine example of exclusive rationality because there was 
no evidence in the record to support the illegitimate end Justice 
White eventually landed upon, while in Moreno, the legislative 
history provided it. But the possibility that the regulation can 
rationally serve some illegitimate ends does not change whether 
it can rationally serve other, legitimate ones. In Clover Leaf 
Creamery, for example, the Court had before it both legitimate 
(environmental) and arguably illegitimate (protectionist) ends, 
and Justice Brennan used rationality inclusively—to identify a 
permissible end to which the statute could be rationally related.99 
It may be that the presence of illegitimate ends should warrant 
heightened scrutiny, but it does not change the nature (or 
existence) of rationality itself. 
The two inquiries—using rationality to include ends or using 
rationality to exclude them—might seem like logical 
complements, but they are not because of the low standard that 
 
 99. See supra notes 46–47 and accompanying text. 
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mere rationality requires. The sort of instrumental rationality 
employed by the Court is defined by a causal relationship between 
means and ends,100 but neither causation nor rationality includes 
a self-defining description of how close that relationship has to be 
to qualify as “rational,”101 what statisticians would refer to as an 
“effect size.”102 Rationality describes a relationship between 
inferences and a conclusion,103 and the point of the rational basis 
test is to require the state to articulate that the necessary 
relationship can plausibly exist, not to demonstrate that it exists 
to any particular degree. 
The lack of reciprocity between the inclusive and exclusive 
uses of rationality becomes clear when one considers a third 
lesson one can draw from how Moreno was decided: that while 
rationality can effectively constrain legislative discretion, it 
cannot effectively constrain judicial discretion. The lack of an 
accepted effect size in order for a particular causal relationship to 
qualify as rational is not a problem when including potential ends 
because the Court is only looking for the existence of the 
relationship, not its strength. When using rationality to exclude 
ends, though, the Court requires a threshold below which it might 
find a causal relationship but not rationality, and it is the Court 
itself that determines how large an effect size is required in order 
to find a relationship rational. Thus, Justice Brennan did not make 
the strong claim that the unrelated persons provision would stop 
no abuse (for surely it would stop some), just that it would not 
stop enough in order to qualify as rational. 
Like Justice White did in his Beazer dissent, Justice Brennan 
used rationality to exclude potential legitimate governmental 
ends from consideration. Justice Brennan had an even stronger 
case for the illegitimacy of the statute because, unlike in Beazer, 
there actually was direct evidence of an illegitimate legislative 
motive in the legislative history: statements that the provision was 
 
 100. C.G. Hempel, Rational Action, PROCEEDINGS AND ADDRESSES OF THE 
AMERICAN PHILOSOPHICAL ASSOCIATION 7 (1961-62).  
 101. David Lewis, Causation, 70 J. OF PHIL. 556, 558 (1970). 
 102. See BARBARA G. TABACHNICK AND LINDA S. FIDELL, USING MULTIVARIATE 
STATISTICS 199 (5th ed. 2006). In statistics, what is measured is not causation but 
correlation, which has to be interpreted in order to make causative claims, but the 
relationship to effect size is the same. Id. at 596.  
 103. See John Ladd, The Place of Practical Reason in Judicial Decision, in NOMOS 
VII: RATIONAL DECISION 127–28 (Carl J. Friedrick ed. 1964) (“By a ‘rational decision’ I 
mean a decision for which the agent can give good reasons.”). 
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intended to discriminate against “hippies” and “hippie 
communes.”104 But because rationality review will uphold a 
statute if it is supported by any legitimate governmental interest 
(unless the illegitimate one is one that leads to heightened 
scrutiny,105 which discrimination against hippies did not), it was 
necessary for Justice Brennan to not only identify the illegitimate 
governmental end he did but also to eliminate the other, 
legitimate ends advanced by the government. He was able to do 
so only because of the lack of an agreed upon description of the 
minimum rationality required to uphold a statute; once Justice 
Brennan insisted on more than a plausible description of the 
causal relationship to establish the rationality of the provision, his 
claim that the statute was not rational enough to qualify as 
rational became nonfalsifiable. By decrying an inadequate 
quantity of something that no one was prepared to quantify, the 
Court’s discretion became unbounded by the constraints of 
rationality. 
It is possible to restate the rational causal relationships 
mathematically106 by describing the relationship between accurate 
and inaccurate classifications, but even then disagreement as to 
application swamps mathematical comparison. In Craig v. Boren, 
for example, the majority found the statute (a differential 
drinking age for men and women) to fail the heightened standard 
of substantial relationship to an important governmental 
objective that is applied to sex-based classifications.107 Oklahoma 
offered a variety of statistical arguments, which the Court 
rejected: 
Viewed in terms of the correlation between sex and the actual 
activity that Oklahoma seeks to regulate—driving while under 
the influence of alcohol—the statistics broadly establish that 
.18% of females and 2% of males in that age group were 
arrested for that offense. While such a disparity is not trivial in 
a statistical sense, it hardly can form the basis for employment 
of a gender line as a classifying device. Certainly if maleness is 
 
 104. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 537 (1973). 
 105. Vill. of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Dev’t Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 
(1977). 
 106. See TABACHNICK AND FIDELL, supra note 102, at 199. 
 107. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976) (“[C]lassifications by gender must serve 
important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of 
those objectives.”). 
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to serve as a proxy for drinking and driving, a correlation of 2% 
must be considered an unduly tenuous “fit.”108 
The 2% number represents a comparison between all males 
age 18-20 (the class actually affected by the restriction) and males 
who drove drunk (the class whose behavior the statute attempted 
to modify). The dissent, on the other hand, did not see the 
relevant comparison as between the number of men affected and 
the men who drove drunk but between the number of men who 
drove drunk (2%) and the number of women who drove drunk 
(only .18%), because the statute discriminated on the basis of 
sex.109 If evaluated by that distinction, the relevant number is not 
the .02 likelihood of a man 18-20 driving drunk but that men are 
eleven times more likely to drive drunk than similarly aged 
women, an effect size likely large enough to convince even the 
most skeptical. 
At issue in such cases is not the mathematics of probability 
and rationality but a normative question about how to define the 
affected and targeted classes. Given that underlying dispute, it is 
perhaps fortunate that the Court in Craig eschewed the false 
determinacy of statistics in applying its review.110 
Of course, the requirement to produce statistical evidence to 
support a statute’s application goes far beyond both the demands 
of rational basis scrutiny and the likely capacity of even the 
federal government were it put to such a test in the potentially 
limitless number of rational basis cases it could face. Imagine the 
Department of Agriculture being required to produce statistical 
evidence about the relative number of deserving and abusing food 
stamp recipients as a percentage of those who live in households 
with unrelated persons in order to demonstrate the statute’s 
rationality. The administrative cost of detecting abusers was itself 
the government’s justification for the provision; it would 
approach irony to require it to do so in order to defend the 
constitutionality of the statute at the insistence of even a single 
objector willing to litigate. As Justice Stevens wrote in Beazer, 
irrationality is going to exist at the margins of every regulation, 
since every regulation is over- and under-inclusive at the 
 
 108. Id. at 201–02. 
 109. Id. at 225–26. 
 110. Id. at 204 (“[P]roving broad sociological propositions by statistics is a dubious 
business, and one that inevitably is in tension with the normative philosophy that underlies 
the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
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margin.111 The rational basis test is designed with this in mind: If 
the government can establish a reasoned causal relationship 
between the means and a legitimate end, that should be the end 
of the inquiry. 
The lack of a framework for applying rationality in its 
exclusive rather than inclusive sense opens the door to sophistry 
in both its malicious and innocent senses.112 A requirement of not 
just a reasoned causal relationship but some minimum effect size 
combined with both the conceptual and practical difficulty of 
quantifying effects in rational basis cases allows Justices who wish 
to strike statutes for other reasons to make non-falsifiable claims 
that a particular provision fails to demonstrate “enough” 
rationality to be rational. Comparing Justice Brennan’s majority 
with Justice Rehnquist’s dissent is an exercise in frustration 
largely because the two opinions are talking past each other. 
Rehnquist argued the relationship between the unrelated persons 
provision and the prevention of abuse,113 and Brennan, even while 
assuming the existence of a causal relationship between unrelated 
persons and abuse,114 did not think the relationship rose to the 
level of rationality. There is not only no way to know who was 
right, the lack of an accepted principle for deciding what 
constitutes the relevant effect size in rational basis cases means 
that there is no way to know how we’d decide who was right. 
The fourth lesson of Moreno is that the lack of any inherent 
principle for applying rationality in its exclusive sense makes 
rational basis plus review effectively insurmountable. Indeed, the 
way scholars identify cases as being rational basis “plus” cases is 
by noting that the Court claims to apply rational basis review but 
strikes the statute.115 Justice O’Connor’s description of rational 
 
 111. New York City Transit Authority v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 590–91 (1979).  
 112. 2 THE WORKS OF SAMUEL JOHNSON IN NINE VOLUMES (No. 31) (Oxford 1825) 
(“[M]en who cannot deceive others, are very often successful in deceiving themselves; they 
weave their sophistry till their own reason is entangled, and repeat their positions till they 
are credited by themselves; by often contending, they grow sincere in the cause; and by 
long wishing for demonstrative arguments, they at last bring themselves to fancy that they 
have found them.”). 
 113. U.S. Dep’t of Agric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 546 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., 
dissenting). 
 114. Id. at 535–36. 
 115. Note that by definition I am excluding cases in which the Court acknowledges 
that it is applying heightened scrutiny, including cases that were previously decided 
applying some form of a “rational basis” standard but which the Court later acknowledged 
would be decided under heightened scrutiny, as in the case of sex. See supra note 17. 
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basis plus scrutiny in Lawrence v. Texas tellingly continues “to 
strike down such laws”116 not “to evaluate such laws.” Not even 
strict scrutiny is so consistently fatal. Rational basis plus allows 
the Court to strike statutes without actually acknowledging that it 
is applying a higher standard, avoiding criticism of its choice to do 
so. In Adarand Constructors v. Pena, concerning the application 
of strict scrutiny to racial classifications, Justice O’Connor only 
knew to defend strict scrutiny from charges of being “strict in 
theory but fatal in fact,”117 because of her willingness to 
acknowledge that the Court was in fact applying strict scrutiny. 
No such defense is necessary for the heightened scrutiny of 
rational basis plus exactly because the Court does not feel 
compelled to acknowledge its existence, leaving litigants with 
little opportunity to argue how the statute in question satisfies the 
standard. It is difficult to imagine a government brief citing 
Moreno as part of an argument that that provision satisfies the 
standard applied in that case. Rational basis plus is a one-way 
street toward constitutional invalidation. 
I am not suggesting that other forms of review are necessarily 
more deterministic than rationality review, after all there is no 
machine for measuring whether a governmental interest rises to 
the level of being “compelling.” In cases requiring an 
“important”118 or “compelling” governmental interest,119 the 
Court is not identifying such interests as though they exist in 
nature, it is defining them. When the Court explains that 
promoting diversity in higher education is a compelling 
governmental interest, it is not calling upon a concept of 
“compelling” as recognized in broader thought; it is making a 
claim that the Court (as opposed to some outside authority) 
believes this interest is important enough to support race-based 
classification and the Court necessarily takes responsibility for 
making that claim. The same is not true of rationality review, in 
which the Court is invoking the concept of rationality—a concept 
 
 116. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the 
judgment) (“When a law exhibits such a desire to harm a politically unpopular group, we 
have applied a more searching form of rational basis review to strike down such laws under 
the Equal Protection Clause.”). 
 117. Adarand Constructors v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 237 (1995) (“Finally, we wish to 
dispel the notion that strict scrutiny is “strict in theory, but fatal in fact.”). 
 118. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). 
 119. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
NACHBAR_DRAFT 4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/13/17  12:45 PM 
2017] RATIONAL BASIS “PLUS” 475 
 
whose primary meaning is exogenous to law—to justify its role in 
conducting constitutional review.120 
Fifth, the pliability of rational basis plus demonstrates that 
that the real work the Court does in equal protection cases is in 
choosing a level of scrutiny for a particular form of discrimination, 
not in applying the standard of review that level of scrutiny 
demands. The question of whether we should view race-based 
classifications with greater suspicion than we view other 
classifications is, unlike the question of whether denying food 
stamps to households with unrelated persons will actually curb 
food stamp abuse, a question of constitutional dimensions. The 
Court instructs that the Constitution is more concerned about 
race than it is about practically any other form of 
discrimination,121 and in telling us that, the Court has said 
something important about the Constitution. In order to make 
such claims, the Court needs to speak with clarity, which it cannot 
do when it makes largely unsupported (and generally 
unsupportable) claims that are tied to the efficacy of a particular 
statute, as it does in applying rational basis review. 
Rational basis plus scrutiny should stand as Exhibit 1 in the 
case for retaining and building upon the Court’s tiered approach 
to equal protection scrutiny. Each equal protection case the Court 
confronts currently requires it to resolve two issues: what level of 
scrutiny to apply, which tells us about how constitutionally 
sensitive the classification is, and whether the provision in 
question actually satisfies the chosen level of scrutiny, which tells 
us very little. Suggestions that the Court abandon the tiers of 
scrutiny, as Justice Marshall famously did122 and some academics 
have,123 would result in even less clarity and even more intractable 
arguments, as every inquiry would devolve into a combined 
inquiry that produces only one determination: whether the 
 
 120. Nachbar, supra note 1, at 1663–71. 
 121. Adarand, 515 U.S. at 227. 
 122. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 98–99 (1973) 
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (“A principled reading of what this Court has done reveals that 
it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative of the 
Equal Protection Clause.”). Cf. id. at 59 (Stewart, J., concurring) (“I join the opinion and 
judgment of the Court because I am convinced that any other course would mark an 
extraordinary departure from principled adjudication under the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment. The unchartered directions of such a departure are 
suggested, I think, by the imaginative dissenting opinion my Brother MARSHALL has 
filed today.”). 
 123. E.g., Goldberg, supra note 18. 
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specific statute survives. Although the answer to that question is 
important to the litigants in a particular case, it tells us very little 
about the Constitution. 
CONCLUSION 
The question we should be asking ourselves after Moreno is 
not whether the unrelated person restriction was rationally 
related to reducing abuse of the program (it clearly was) but 
rather is how Justice Brennan could so easily strike a statute that 
he was convinced implicated fundamental rights—in two separate 
ways—without actually applying a different standard of review. 
The answer lies in the rational basis test itself, which claims 
legitimacy by virtue of its connection to the normatively neutral 
concept of rationality but provides practically no restraint on 
judicial discretion. 
Even at its best, the use of rationality review to exclude ends 
lends itself to intractable disagreements over whether a means is 
adequately proximate to the end it serves. At its worst, rationality 
used as part of an exclusive rather than inclusive inquiry into 
legislative ends can too readily serve as cover for outcomes driven 
by other justifications, as appears to have happened in Moreno 
itself. My complaint is not that the Court is being disingenuous 
when it claims to apply rationality review but actually applies 
something stricter, it is that rationality review particularly lends 
itself to such misuse, intentional or otherwise, and that it is 
possible to counter this potential misuse by insisting that 
rationality be used only in its inclusive rather than exclusive sense. 
Although one might at first blush see my proposal—to 
prevent the use of rationality to exclude proffered ends as not 
rationally related to means—as an extreme modification of 
rational basis review that guts it of any force, it is actually fairly 
modest and unlikely to have much effect on current practice. My 
proposal affects only a particular use of one part of the test. The 
test remains available to strike statutes in singular pursuit of an 
illegitimate end, as occurred in Zobel v. Williams, striking 
Alaska’s retrospective distribution of oil dividends,124 or in cases 
where the means is not rationally related to a stipulated end, as 
was the case in Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. County 
Commission of Webster County, in which the Court struck a 
 
 124. Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55, 65 (1982).  
NACHBAR_DRAFT 4.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 7/13/17  12:45 PM 
2017] RATIONAL BASIS “PLUS” 477 
 
taxation scheme as irrational because the state had limited itself 
to a particular means of assessing land value.125 Moreover, my 
modification only limits the use of rationality as an interpretive 
method. The Court would still have available to it other 
interpretive tools to connect means to ends, much as it does in 
cases calling for heightened scrutiny.126 That is actually what the 
Court has been doing for decades. Cases striking statutes while 
applying the most deferential form of rational basis review are 
practically unheard of, and yet the legal system endures. 
In practice but not word, the Court has done exactly what I 
propose it do: elevate the scrutiny when it believes doing so is 
justified for some reason exogenous to the rational basis test itself. 
The only implication under my proposal is that, by limiting the 
use of rationality to strike a statute, the Court must acknowledge 
it is elevating scrutiny in the cases in which it currently does sub 
silentio. Escalating scrutiny, in turn, will prompt the Court to 
supply a justification for doing so. In such justification lies the best 
hope for the Court to develop the constitutional law of equal 
protection. 
 
 125. 488 U.S. 336, 338 (1989). See supra note 81. 
 126. See Vill. of Arlington Hts. v. Metro. Housing Dev’t Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266–67 
(1977) (describing forms of evidence of illegitimate legislative intent). 
